A Free Nation Deep in Debt: The Financial Roots of Democracy

Author: James Macdonald
List Price: $30.00
Our Price: Click to see the latest and low price
ISBN: 0374171432
Publisher: Farrar Straus & Giroux (08 January, 2003)
Sales Rank: 79,889
Average Customer Rating: 4.4 out of 5

Customer Reviews

Rating: 5 out of 5
England's Democracy versus France's Ancien Regime
MacDonald argues that democracy arose to allow governments to borrow for war from their people. There is superb chapter on France versus England in eighteenth century. England had half the GNP of France, but it was always able to outspend France in their wars. England relied on 3% perpetual debt, readily marketable by holders, with published information about budget and single market indicator of England's credit rating. Plus England was run by "heroic citizen-creditors" who were willing to entrust their capital to Bank of England (for loan for war) because they ran the government and were sure they would get taxes to make the debt sound.
France had kings who defaulted on a whim, a bramble bush
of borrowing instruments, a terribly inefficient tax system, with lots of exemptions for their aristocrats, no public information and a lousy resale market. French citizen did not lend to France. England paid 3% on its debt and France paid 11% on its debt as the Revolution neared. England carried debt of double its GNP and France went bankrupt which killed the ancien regime with debt of 2/3d of GNP. Terrific story.
MacDonald is concise and accurate summarizer of the literature on issues (American Revolutionary War debt) that I know about.


Rating: 4 out of 5
Insightful!
This impressively researched opus reflects an obsession with One Big Idea that never comes quite clearly into focus, but revolves around the critical historical role played by national credit. Behold an author who not only quotes the Biblical book of Numbers, but also interprets it as a document of financial history, ignoring the contentious issues of authorship and anachronism that make scriptural exegesis such challenging work for specialists. He traces the way government and conflict are funded from Herodotus to the Hanoverian Court to Woodrow Wilson. Like the River Platte, this work is a mile wide and an inch deep; but the river has a definite direction, and this meanders. If you fancy an intriguing browse through major and minor points of political and fiscal history, we have found just the book for you. Some scenes are indelible, like the Germans celebrating WWI bond purchases by driving iron nails into a big wooden statue of a Field Marshall, and may jolt you if you think Allied and Axis powers were funded differently. The U.K. and the U.S. sponsored similar popular financial mobilizations, complete with bombastic slogans (no statues, though).


Rating: 4 out of 5
An excellent history of public debt and its role in developi
This book is not what you think. The title suggests the repeat of the theme exposed by Paul Kennedy in the 80s in his book "The Rise and Fall of Great Powers." But, the two books advance almost symmetrically opposed theories. Paul Kennedy suggested that great powers eventually decline because they can't withstand the fiscal burden of maintaining a nonproductive military effort to govern their empire (the Imperial Overstretch concept). Macdonald instead advances that a public bond market is a nation?s best tool in raising funds for emergencies such as warfare. In Kennedy's book debt is bad. In Macdonald it is good.

Macdonald's argument starts with the fiscal stress associated with having to raise huge amount of funds in preparation for warfare. In such situation, raising taxes is impractical. Often tax rates would have had to double or treble to raise adequate funds to finance wars throughout history. A government can?t do that without causing a revolution. Often what states and government did before the advent of well developed public bond markets was to mine their grounds (or grounds of conquered territories) for mineral riches (gold and silver). The states would then hoard these gold reserves as funds available for a rainy day (war). But, as Macdonald points out this treasure hoarding was most inefficient from an economic standpoint.

Public debt markets became a much preferred alternative to treasure hoarding for financing wars. This was true for several reasons. Treasure hoarding represented a huge amount of wasted capital not reinvested in the economy where it could have generated rapidly rising living standards for society at large. Bond financing (public debt) was so much more flexible a tool for war financing than an ongoing tasking treasure hoarding mechanism.

Comparing two countries, one being a bond borrower, the other a treasure hoarder, one could readily observe that the bond borrower economy would grow much faster, and that it would have an easier time to finance wars when and as needed. Typically, you run out of gold reserve faster than you run out of a state's borrowing capacity.

But, for a public debt market to thrive you need democratic institutions. In democracies, the motivation of the government and its citizen are aligned. This facilitates a trust between the creditors (citizens) and the borrower (the government). As a result, democratic governments can borrow more and at a lower interest costs then other governments. In other words, the creditors of a democratic government assess a lower credit and counterparty risk to a democratic government, and therefore demand a lower risk premium (lower interest rates). This is Macdonald's main argument. Therefore, he concludes that the pressure to create public credit markets to finance wars was an impetus to create public debt markets and in turn to develop democratic institutions.

Macdonald's theory is so current. Today, it is self evident that the countries who have the most transparent disclosure, integer accounting system, accountable governance associated with democracies can borrow at a substantially lower cost than others.

Similar Products

The Mind and the Market : Capitalism in Modern European Thought
Republic of Debtors : Bankruptcy in the Age of American Independence


Book Index