Tirole applies the basic principles of the prudential regulation of banks, that he worked before in collaboration with Mathias Dewatripont (MIT Press, 1994, ISBN: 0262041464), and which contains much of what we have learned through the twentieth century about financial crises. According to this approach, both the international financial and monetary systems would work much better if we had international risk classifying agencies on the one hand, providing information to investors about the liquidity and solvency of debtor countries, and a lender of last resort on the other. The trouble with the IMF is that it tries to perform both functions.
However, what makes external borrowing more complicated than a typical financial arrangement is the presence of a third player, that is the borrower's government which has both the incentives and the means to affect the foreing investor's return by manipulating the exchange rate or the capital mobility. Because the investors' return is affected by the behaviour of two agents, the borrower himself and its government, Tirole calls this a dual agency problem.
Tirole proposes an institutional reform in which the IMF should redefine its original mission, by concentrating in the role of facilitating the country's favourable access to foreign borrowing. This role underlies the (controversial) task of pre-qualification and conditionality. The IMF should also redefine its internal structure if it wants to perform well this new role. Its Board of Governors is too big and too heterogeneous to allow rapid and efficient decisions.
In summary, this book presents and original and groundbreaking approach to financial crises which, as we expected from the beginning, arises more questions than answers. However, we know that the only way to find the appropriate solution to a problem is by formulating the right questions, and this is exactly what Tirole does. I am convinced that if the international agencies follow this approach they will soon find the right way to prevent or to lessen international financial crises, in the same way as central banks and financial regulatory agencies did with domestic banking crises during the last century.