The Theory of Learning in Games (Economic Learning and Social Evolution)
Author: Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
List Price: $42.00
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ISBN: 0262061945
Publisher: MIT Press (22 May, 1998)
Sales Rank: 82,605
Average Customer Rating: 4 out of 5
Customer Reviews
Rating: 4 out of 5
Learning Learning in Games
An excellent treatise on some important work in the theory of learning in games. Fudenberg and Levine provide a good coverage of standard myopic play dynamics with a special emphasis on ficticious play and replicator dynamics. I particularly liked the sections going through the Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) model as well as Young (1993) on the evolution of convention. The treatments of dynamic systems analysis, elementary game theory, stochastic approximation theory, etc., are necessarily short. The appendices do not suffice for a reader without a reasonable background.
Nonetheless an essential read for anybody doing serious work in learning, or wanting to know what all the fuss is about.
Rating: 4 out of 5
Good book
During the work on my master thesis ("Learning in strategic games") i bought several books about the topic. This is the one of them. Chapters 1 and 2 (Introduction, Fictitious Play) are really good introduction into the subject. The following chapters evolve the theory further giving some good ideas for practical implementation (I was writing a C program which had to be able to play the game and to learn). I would recommend this book to anyone interested in relatively new field - Learning in games. Similar Products
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